This paper compares the new uniform-price U.S. Treasury auctions to the traditional discriminatory mechanism and examines the extent to which the auction mechanisms are responsible for underpricing. Empirically, I …nd that even for the newer uniform-price auctions, the average price received by the Treasury is less than the price of the same securities in the concurrent secondary market, although this underpricing is reduced by half relative to the older mechanism. The auctions are modeled in a multi-unit common-value setting with a winner's curse problem. Underpricing results in equilibrium for both auction formats, although to a greater degree for the discriminatory auction. In the context of the model, the equilibrium level of underpricing in an individual auction can be predicted from the summary statistics released by the Treasury after each auction. Empirical results show that the magnitude of underpricing in the auctions, and the cross-sectional variation in underpricing, is consistent with the model.
Introduction
Every year, the U.S. government auctions some three trillion dollars of Treasury securities to …nance the public debt. Given the amounts involved, any mispricing implies a large wealth transfer. For instance, underpricing of one cent per $100 of face value results in an annual transfer of about $300 million from the government to auction participants.
A number of papers have documented underpricing in the older discriminatory auctions for U.S. Treasury securities. The mean winning yield in the auction, on average, exceeds the yield in the secondary and "when-issued" markets. 1 At least partially in response to this underpricing, the U.S. Treasury has changed the auction format from the discriminatory auction, in which each winning bidder pays his own bid, to the uniform-price auction, in which all winning bidders pay the same market-clearing price. 2 In contrast to the U.S., many government securities auctions worldwide still use the discriminatory mechanism. 3 This paper makes three contributions. First, I document empirically that underpricing remains after the switch from discriminatory to uniform-price auctions, although the amount of underpricing is reduced by about half. Second I model the Treasury auction as a multi-unit common values auction with a winner's curse problem, and I show that underpricing should arise in equilibrium under both auction formats, but more so for discriminatory auctions. The model predicts that the magnitude of underpricing depends on the bid-to-cover ratio 4 and the dispersion of bids. Finally, by calibrating the model to the observed bid-to-cover ratio and bid dispersion of each individual auction, I show 1 The when-issued market is a forward market for the Treasury securities that are being auctioned, with delivery to take place on the issue date. 2 Highlighting the uncertainty regarding the relative merits of the two auction formats, the U.S. Treasury reverted back to the discriminatory mechanism for its buyback program to repurchase outstanding 30-year bonds. See Hanke (2002) . 3 See Bartolini and Cottarelli (1997) . 4 The bid-to-cover is the ratio of aggregate bids tendered to the supply of securities o¤ered.
that the magnitude of observed underpricing, both on average and in the cross section, is consistent with the model.
The existing theoretical Treasury auction literature comparing the two mechanisms, motivated by the policy debate, focuses on issues such as potential collusion, the interaction between the auction and secondary markets, and short squeezes. One motivation of this paper is to better understand the way in which the auction mechanism a¤ects revenue in the absence of bidder power or strategic behavior. Even without bidder power, I show that underpricing should exist and that the auction format a¤ects the amount of underpricing in the auction.
Most importantly, by limiting myself to a relatively simple description of the auction, I can use the publicly announced results of each auction to calibrate the model and to predict the magnitude of underpricing for each individual auction. I compare the model's predictions to the observed underpricing to test whether the model explains the data, or if it is likely that there are other economic in ‡uences, such as those described elsewhere in the theoretical literature, that are needed to explain the data.
In the discriminatory-auction model, the Treasury auctions a quantity of securities to a number of bidders, each of whom gets a noisy signal of the common value of the security.
Each bidder bids for one unit at a price that maximizes his expected pro…t. The highest bidders pay their bids and are awarded the securities. If all bidders knew the true value of the securities, they would compete away all pro…ts. But since there is uncertainty, there will be numerous winning prices, so each bidder reduces his bid in an attempt to be among the lowest winning bidders. In equilibrium, all bidders reduce their bids -even beyond the winner's curse -and earn positive expected pro…ts, i.e., underpricing occurs.
The level of underpricing depends on the bid-to-cover ratio and the noise in the bidders' signals.
In uniform-price auctions, all winning bidders pay the market-clearing price. In this case, lowering a bid beyond the winner's curse only occurs to the extent that a bidder is likely to be marginal. Thus, with many bidders, there is only a small amount of underpricing in equilibrium.
For the empirical analysis, I compare the auction results to the secondary market data from GovPX (which is considerably more comprehensive and accurate than the data used in the literature previously). I …nd that uniform-price auctions of notes and bonds have statistically signi…cant underpricing averaging 0.32 basis points (corresponding to 1.3 cents per $100) which is close to the magnitude of underpricing predicted by the model. This is the …rst time that statistically signi…cant underpricing has been documented since the US Treasury switched to the uniform-price mechanism. I …nd that discriminatory auctions of notes and bonds result in underpricing averaging 0.59 basis points in yield space (corresponding to 3.5 cents per $100). This is, in fact, slightly lower than the average underpricing predicted by the model. While underpricing remains after the change in the auction mechanism, underpricing in the uniform-price auctions is statistically signi…cantly less than it was under the discriminatory mechanism.
I also measure the underpricing in each individual auction. Taking advantage of heterogeneity across auctions, I compare the underpricing in each auction to that predicted by the model. I …nd a strong correlation between predicted and observed underpricing.
There has been little evidence of underpricing in uniform-price Treasury auctions until now. Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) , Malvey and Archibald (1998) , and Reinhart and Belzer (1997) do not …nd statistically signi…cant underpricing, most likely due to the limited number of auctions they consider. The earlier literature that documents un-derpricing in the older discriminatory Treasury auctions was limited by the quality of secondary market data available at the time. However, the estimate of the average underpricing in discriminatory auctions in this paper is similar to those of the studies that use interdealer broker data. 5 The Treasury's use of the discriminatory auctions has raised controversy ever since Friedman (1960 Friedman ( , 1991 argued that the Treasury could reduce the cost of …nancing the debt by switching to uniform-price auctions. Theoretical papers comparing the two Treasury auction procedures include Bikhchandani and Huang (1993) and Chari and Weber (1992) which appeal to single unit auction theory (Milgrom and Weber (1992) ) to argue that uniform-price auctions are revenue superior. The model in this paper is in the same spirit, but explicitly considers the Treasury 5 Cammack (1991) and Spindt and Stolz (1992) use indicative quotes from the New York Federal Reserve. That data is biased, and as a result they overestimate the degree of underpricing. Bikhchandani, Edsparr and Huang (2000), Simon (1994a) and Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) are limited by only having limited data from one interdealer broker. 6 Apparently, Friedman was referring to Simon's (1994b) study of the Treasury's experiment with uniform-price auctions in the 1970s when Friedman suggested that the Treasury could increase auction revenue by 0.75%. However, the results in Simon may be driven by an unusual outlier.
auction as a sale of a large quantity of securities in order to clarify the relation between the mechanism and the extent of underpricing.
Much of the theoretical literature on Treasury auctions has been focused away from the basic auction theory and allows for strategic bidding. This includes discussions of how the auction market can interact with the secondary market. Chaterjea and Jarrow (1998) argue that discriminatory auctions are susceptible to manipulation. Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) argue that uniform-price auctions are more susceptible to overbidding as participants try to send signals to the secondary market. Viswanathan and Wang (2000) discuss how dealer inventories a¤ect bidding strategies especially in discriminatory auctions. Another stream of the literature discusses the potential for implicit collusion in uniform-price auctions. This was …rst discussed in Wilson (1979) , followed by Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (2002) and generalized by Ausubel and Cramton (2002) who show that with divisible goods, the auction ranking is ambiguous. In an experimental study, Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1996) …nd that collusive equilibria can occur. However, Kremer and Nyborg (2003) argues that these type of equilibria are not robust.
In this paper, I put aside the above issues by setting up the model so that individual bidders have little market power. Thus, one can more fully examine the auction mechanisms in a simpler setting. Most importantly, it allows for the quantitative predictions of underpricing in each auction, and shows that market power is not necessary to explain the observed levels of underpricing.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents the empirical results on average underpricing in discriminatory and uniform-price Treasury auctions. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the methods used to infer the model variables from the publicly released auction results. Section 5 contains the empirical analysis comparing the theoretical predictions to the observed underpricing. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A and a description of the Treasury auction procedure is in Appendix B.
Summary Statistics and Average Underpricing

Summary of data
The data consists of the announced results for 283 Treasury note and bond auctions that took place between June 1991 and December 2000, and the corresponding secondary market prices at the times of the auctions. Traditionally, Treasury auctions were conducted using the discriminatory mechanism, in which each winning bidder pays a price corresponding to his bid. In September 1992, as an experiment, the Treasury began auctioning 2-year and 5-year notes using the uniform-price mechanism, in which all winning bidders pay the same market-clearing price. The uniform-price mechanism was extended to all maturities in August 1998.
In all, the data includes 105 discriminatory and 178 uniform-price auctions. Index linked securities are excluded, as are reissues of existing securities. A small number of auctions are excluded when secondary market data is not available for the period immediately before the auction.
The auction result data are drawn from the announcements issued by the Treasury after each auction. For discriminatory auctions, the announced results include the highest winning (i.e., market-clearing) yield, the average winning yield, and the lowest yield bid 6 in the auction. 7 For uniform-price auctions, they include the highest winning yield, the median winning yield, and the 95th percentile winning bid in the auction. In all cases, the Treasury announces the total amount bid and awarded, as well as the extent of rationing to bidders exactly at the margin. Details of individual bids are never revealed. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the auctions. The most commonly issued securities are the 2-year and 5-year notes which were auctioned monthly over the time period. The auction size averages $15.5 billion (face value) of securities o¤ered, and the bid-to-cover ratio, i.e., the ratio of bids submitted to o¤ering amount, averages 2.31. A commonly used measure of bid dispersion is the "tail," measured as the di¤erence, in yield space, between the marginal winning bid and the average winning bid (or, in the case of uniform-price auctions, the median winning bid). The tail is substantially larger in uniform-price auctions than in discriminatory auctions (although the di¤erent de…nitions of tail make them not perfectly comparable). One could argue that the wider dispersion of bids in uniform-price auctions re ‡ects weaker incentives for bidders to collect accurate information prior to participating in a uniform-price auction.
Insert T able 1
The secondary market data is from GovPX. The GovPX data is far more comprehensive than previously available data and includes all the quotes and trades from the interdealer market as supplied by all but one of the major interdealer brokers. 8 I consider the prices in the when-issued market, i.e., the forward market on the yet-to-be-issued securities, from a half hour before the 1:00 p.m. auction time until a half hour after the 7 Recall that the auction is conducted in yield space, so the winning bids are those with the lowest yields. 8 The missing interdealer broker is Cantor Fitzgerald. I obtain very similar quantitative results using Cantor-Fitzgerald's data for an earlier sample of discriminatory auctions. auction time. The when-issued market is very active with an average of about $1 billion of the auctioned security trading in the hour around the auction. Table 2 presents statistics of secondary market activity at the time of the auction.
Insert T able 2
Average underpricing
Underpricing is measured as the auction yield minus the yield on the same securities in the when-issued market. For discriminatory auctions, the auction yield is de…ned as the quantity-weighted average yield of the winning bids. 9 For uniform-price auctions, the auction yield is de…ned as the market clearing yield. The when-issued yield is taken as the quantity-weighted average transaction yield in the ten minutes prior to the 1:00 p.m. auction deadline. For robustness, I also measure underpricing in the half hour before the auction, as well as the half hour after the auction. Table 3 presents the average underpricing in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions.
Insert T able 3
In the discriminatory auctions the average underpricing is 0.59 basis points. This is statistically signi…cant and consistent with previous studies on the older auction mechanism. With more that $3 trillion of government debt held by the public, this implies about $200 million of extra debt servicing per year. 9 Because yield is locally linear in price, this measure is almost exactly the same as the yield corresponding to the average winning price. For the empirical purposes of this paper, measuring underpricing in yield space reduces the heteroskedasticity in price space that would otherwise result from di¤erences in duration across the securities. 10 Measuring the when-issued yield using equally-weighted transaction yields does not change any results in this paper. Using quotes rather than transactions also makes very little di¤erence.
One of the basic policy questions is whether the use of uniform-price auctions reduces or even eliminates underpricing. In uniform-price auctions I …nd a statistically signi…cant 0.32 basis points of underpricing on average. This is the …rst time that statistically signi…cant underpricing has been documented for the newer mechanism. However, I also …nd that the di¤erence in underpricing between the two methods (0.27 basis points) is also statistically signi…cant. Thus, one can conclude that the switch to the new uniform-price format has reduced underpricing, although a lower level of underpricing still persists.
The Auction Model
In this section I model the discriminatory and uniform-price auctions with the goal of showing that underpricing should result in equilibrium, and that the auction mechanism a¤ects the degree of underpricing in equilibrium. That the auction mechanism can a¤ect underpricing in common-value auctions is well known (see, for example, Milgrom and Weber (1982) for the single unit case). However, this model is designed to be taken to data and calibrated using the announced results of each Treasury auction. It can then be used to predict the magnitude of underpricing in each auction, thus capturing the heterogeneity in underpricing across auctions.
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, I consider the model with a continuum of bidders, in order to focus on the case when no single bidder has any market power. I show that underpricing arises in equilibrium under the discriminatory, but not the uniform-price auction. In Section 3.3, I extend the analysis to a …nite number of bidders and show that underpricing arises in the uniform-price auction as well. The fraction of all bids that are accepted is ® = Q=D, 0 < ® < 1.
11
Each bidder receives a noisy signal of the true common value of the security, V . V can be interpreted as the resale price of the securities in the subsequent secondary market.
The signal has two noise components, one common and one idiosyncratic. Priors are di¤use. Bidder i receives a signal 1¡F(¢) , be increasing over the entire range.
The signal that each bidder receives is the realized common component,
because there is an in…nite number of bidders, the distribution of realized signals given ¹ V is not random, 13 but is distributed around ¹ V with the distribution F (¢). However, (given 11 ® is the reciprocal of the bid-to-cover ratio. The assumption that ® is known prior to the auction is made for simplicity, and could be easily relaxed. 12 The normal distribution will be assumed for the calibration and numerical results later in this paper. 13 I ignore the problems identi…ed by Judd (1985) regarding the lack of randomness in the aggregate. Anderson (1991) discusses solutions to these problems. the di¤use prior) since S i is the only information available to bidder i, and since all the signals have the same accuracy, bidder i has no way of knowing whether his signal is a high or low draw. In fact, from bidder i's perspective, ¹ V is random with mean S i and variance ¾ 2 1 .
The discriminatory auction proceeds as follows. Simultaneously, each bidder submits a bid B i (S i ).
14
The seller awards the securities to the mass of Q bidders (i.e., the fraction ® of bidders) that submit the highest bids. Each winning bidder pays his submitted bid.
The market-clearing stop-out bid, B s , is the lowest accepted bid, and is determined so that the quantity of bids that are at least B s is equal to Q. That is
where g(Bj ¹ V ) is the density of the bids given ¹ V .
15
Bidder i's problem is to choose a bid function B i (S i ) that maximizes his expected pro…ts. He solves:
i.e., he maximizes the probability of winning the auction times the expected pro…t conditional on winning.
I limit the potential equilibria to those which are "e¢cient", de…ned as those in which the bidders with the highest signals win the auction. 16 E¢ciency necessarily implies symmetry -that all bidders have the same bid function B i (S i ) = B(S i ). In other words, 14 In this model, bids are submitted as prices. In actual Treasury auctions, bids are submitted as yields. 15 If equation (2) has multiple solutions, then B s is de…ned as the highest bid for which equation (2) holds. 16 The term "e¢ciency" is analogous to the same term in the context of private-values auctions. In the private-values literature, it means that the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction. In the context of common values, that de…nition is inappropriate. each bidder uses his information in exactly the same way as all other bidders. E¢ciency also requires pure strategies.
De…ne z as the highest value above which the distribution of2 i has mass ®, i.e., such that F (z) = 1 ¡ ®. The winning bidders will be those with signals above ¹ V + ¾ 1 z. The distribution of signals is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Insert F igure 1
As shown in the following proposition, in equilibrium each bidder bids below his signal Proposition 1 It is an equilibrium for all bidders to bid as follows:
where
Since all bidders shade their bids by exactly the same amount, the distribution of bids, The bidder's …rst-order condition that results in equation (4) can be written as
By symmetry, the equilibrium probability of winning the auction is ® for each bidder. On the one hand, decreasing a bid by one unit will have a marginal bene…t of ®. On the other hand, the probability density of being the marginal bidder is f(z)=¾ 1 , and by decreasing his bid, a bidder risks losing the expected pro…ts earned by the bidder on the margin,
This is the expected pro…t to the bidder on the margin since his signal is biased by ¾ 1 z but he shades his bid by K. The optimal bid equates the marginal bene…t of reducing a bid, ®, with the marginal cost,
The amount of shading is not directly due to the winner's curse. The idea of the winner's curse is that while each signal is an unbiased estimate of the true value, the winners are only those that received a high signal. So although a signal is an unconditionally unbiased estimate of the true value, it is biased upwards conditional upon winning the auction. The winner's curse, for a given ®, is de…ned as the bias in the signal conditional on winning,
Although rational bidders are aware of this and should be expected to shade their bids to compensate for the winner's curse, it is not the winner's curse that determines the extent of shading. The intuition is as follows. If a bidder shades his bid only to compensate for the winner's curse, he is bidding his conditional expectation and expected pro…ts are zero. However, all the winning bidders pay di¤erent prices. Since a given bidder is unlikely to be the marginal bidder (i.e., the one with the lowest winning bid), he can lower his bid further and still have a positive probability of being awarded securities.
In those states in which this lower bid still wins, positive expected pro…ts are earned. If his bid is much lower than the conditional expectation, then the marginal cost of any further decrease is large as he risks losing substantial pro…ts. This tradeo¤ determines the extent of bid shading.
As equation (4) shows, shading is determined by the dispersion of signals, ¾ 1 , (which is also the dispersion of bids), and by the ratio of securities supplied to the quantity of bids tendered, ®. The amount of shading, K , is proportional to ¾ 1 . As bids become more disperse, it is less likely that a bid is marginal and reducing a bid further is unlikely to result in losing the auction, so in equilibrium, bids are lower. In the case when
there is no disagreement and everyone bids ¹ V , competing away all expected pro…ts.
To understand the e¤ect of ® on the extent of bid shading, K, consider the case when the idiosyncratic noise, ¾ 12i , is drawn from a normal distribution. In this case,
is determined with z and f(z) de…ned using the normal distribution.
K is plotted as a function of ® in Figure 2 with ¾ 1 normalized to one. K is a U-shaped function of ®. (Recall that z is de…ned as a function of ®.) When ® is very small, and only the bids in the rightmost tail of the distribution are accepted, the winner's curse is severe, and bids are shaded accordingly. When ® is large, even bidders with low signals win and winning does not imply that a signal is unusually high. Thus, the winner's curse is small. However, underbidding for pro…t seeking reasons increases because the equilibrium marginal bene…t of decreasing a bid, ®, is larger.
Insert F igure 2
Since bidders shade their bids beyond the conditional expectation, underpricing occurs.
Underpricing, (or equivalently the average pro…t to winning bidders), is de…ned as the di¤erence between the true value and the average winning bid,
Proposition 2 The underpricing per unit sold in the auction is
The underpricing is equal to the shading by the bidders minus the bias in their signals conditional on winning (i.e., the winner's curse), minus any common noise in their signals.
The magnitude of expected underpricing, E(¼), is of practical importance as it represents the average amount lost by the Treasury in the auction, or equivalently, it is the rent earned by the bidders for participating in the auction.
When the bidders' signals are drawn from a normal distribution, the underpricing per unit in the auction is
In this case, the di¤erence between the shading, K , and the underpricing, ¼, other than the common noise term, is ¾ 1 f (z)=®, which is the portion of the shading that compensates for the winner's curse.
The expected underpricing in this case is nonnegative and equal to zero when ¾ 1 is equal to zero. 17 It should be kept in mind that the bidders with the highest signals will be overpaying, and bidders may earn negative pro…ts on average if2 0 is a high draw, but expected pro…ts are positive.
The expected underpricing, E(¼); is proportional to the dispersion of signals, ¾ 1 . In the limit as ¾ 1 goes to zero, all bidders agree on ¹ V and compete away the pro…ts. This is related to the linkage principle in single-unit common-value auction theory (Milgrom and Weber (1982) ) that revelation of information prior to the auction leads to greater revenue for the seller. 17 It is possible to construct distributions f () for which there is overpricing. These distributions are not of practical importance and can be assumed away.
From Figure 2 we also see that expected underpricing is an increasing convex function of ®. When ® is large, there is little competition and the marginal bene…t of lowering a bid is high, so K is large, but since many bids are accepted, the winner's curse is small. For small ®, there are two opposing e¤ects. The shading, K , is getting large, but W C is also getting large. The di¤erence, E(¼), is decreasing and approaches 0 as ® approaches 0. This result is intuitively appealing, as a small ratio of supply to bids tendered can be interpreted as a high level of competition. This suggests that if additional bidders enter the market, or the supply available to bidders is reduced, underpricing would diminish.
Uniform-price auction model
So far we have only considered discriminatory auctions. In uniform-price auctions, all winning bidders pay the market clearing bid, i.e., the stop-out bid. I model this auction in exactly the same way as the discriminatory auction except that the bidder i's problem is max
As before, he maximizes the probability of winning the auction times the expected pro…t conditional on winning, except now this pro…t is V ¡ B In a uniform-price auction, the bias in the signal conditional on winning the auction is not the important bias. More important is the bias in the signal of the marginal bidder,
If all bidders submitted their signals as bids, then the price paid by the winning bidders would be ¹ V + ¾ 1 z, and biased by ¾ 1 z.
Proposition 3
In a uniform-price auction there is no expected underpricing in equilibrium. It is an equilibrium for each bidder to bid
In a uniform-price auction with atomistic bidders, there is no equilibrium that results in positive expected underpricing. 18 Otherwise each bidder would want to increase his bid, since that would increase his probability of winning and earning positive pro…ts without increasing the price paid. Similarly, negative pro…ts cannot be expected in equilibrium, as bidders will always want to lower their bids (or not bid at all).
The amount of shading, K u , is simply the di¤erence between the stop-out bidder's signal and ¹ V , which by the de…nition of z is ¾ 1 z. In fact, when ® is large enough for z to be negative, (e.g., in the case of a symmetric distribution, when ® > 0:5), the bidders will shade upwards because the bidder at the stop-out will have a downward biased signal of the true value.
This zero-pro…t result depends crucially on the assumption of atomistic bidders under which no single bidder a¤ects the stop-out bid. Thus, the underpricing empirically observed in uniform-price auctions (as documented in Section 2) must be understood in the context of a model with a …nite number of nonatomistic bidders. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium bids and underpricing in the discriminatory auction:
Proposition 4 In the discriminatory auction with a …nite number of bidders, it is an equilibrium for all bidders to bid as follows:
The expected underpricing per unit sold in the auction is
Assuming that the idiosyncratic noise is drawn from a normal distribution, the expected pro…t is
The …rst thing to notice is that in the limit as N ! 1, (keeping M=N = ®) the equilibrium approaches that of the in…nite bidders case because e Z N¡1 M ! z and the expectations operators fall away.
The expected pro…t under this equilibrium is generally higher than that with a continuum of bidders (as in Propositions (1) and (2)). This is because the winner's curse is less severe with a random stop-out bid, as there is now some probability that a bidder wins the auction with a relatively low bid. As shown in the previous subsection, under the uniform-price auction there is no underpricing when there is a continuum of bidders. This is no longer true with …nitely many bidders.
Proposition 5
In the uniform-price auction with a …nite number of bidders, it is an equilibrium for all bidders to bid as follows:
The main cause of the underpricing is that the bias in the signal of the bidder that the determines the price is ¾ 
Inferences from Auction Results
Section 3 shows theoretically that underpricing should occur in discriminatory auctions. For the uniform-price auction, theory predicts underpricing in the model with a …nite number of bidders. The strength of the models is that they give quantitative predictions for the magnitude of underpricing in each individual auction as a function of ® and ¾ 1 (given the number of bidders N ). To test these predictictions, one must infer ® and ¾ 1 from the announced results of each auction.
As mentioned above, the Treasury releases summary statistics shortly after each auction. The statistics include: quantity tendered; quantity accepted; low, high and average (or median) accepted bids; as well as a number of other statistics. In the context of the model, the variables ® and ¾ 1 can be inferred from these statistics. 19 First, for each auction, ® is simply taken as Quantity Accepted Quantity Tendered . 20 Second, ¾ 1 , being the standard deviation of the bidders' signals, it is not directly observable. However, it can be inferred from the distribution of bids. Recall from the theory that the distribution of bids in equilibrium is simply the distribution of signals shifted to the left by K, so ¾ 1 is also the standard deviation of bids.
In discriminatory auctions the tail, the di¤erence between the average winning bid and the stop-out bid, is observable. In uniform-price auctions, the di¤erence between the median winning bid and the stop-out bid (which I will denote as tail med ) is observable.
Given ®, and assuming that the signals are drawn from a normal distribution, the tail is su¢cient to infer ¾ 1 . Similarly, tail med can be used to infer ¾ 1 . The relationships are:
or
For simplicity, I use the in…nite-number-of-bidders model to make the inference. In addition, I assume that ² i is drawn from a normal distribution. The results are very similar when other similar distributions are assumed. 20 ® can either be taken with or without noncompetitive bids included. I include the noncompetitive bids, but the empirical results are not very sensitive to this choice.
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where z ®=2 is de…ned by 1 ¡ F (z ®=2 ) = ®=2.
I infer the values of ® and ¾ 1 for each auction in the data set. 21 Over the entire data set, ® averages 0.45 in discriminatory auctions and 0.44 in uniform-price auctions. 
Comparison of Theoretical and Empirical Underpricing
In Section 2, we saw that underpricing exists under both the discriminatory and the uniform-price auction formats, although more so under the former. In this section, I …rst test whether the model explains the average observed underpricing for each auction format, and then I test whether the model predicts the observed cross section of underpricing in the auctions.
As described in Section 2, I measure observed underpricing as the di¤erence between the auction yield (i.e., the average winning yield in discriminatory auctions or the market- 21 Since the inferred ® cannot, in general, be written as an integer number of securities divided by the assumed number of bidders; when assuming a …nite number of bidders, I linearly interpolate the theoretical underpricing. 22 I make a small adjustment to the tail to correct for a wide bidding grid in the early part of the sample. In brief, I use the reported rationing at the margin to estimate what the stop-out bid would have been absent the discrete grid. If most bids at the margin are accepted, then I infer that the stop-out price would have been slightly lower. If few bids at the margin are accepted, then I infer that the stop-out price would have been higher. This adjustment does not have a strong a¤ect on the results.
clearing yield in uniform-price auctions) and the yield of the same securities -with the same delivery date -in the forward when-issued market. The when-issued yield used is the average of the interdealer midquotes over the ten-minute period prior to the 1:00 p.m.
auction. Averages are taken to eliminate any bid-ask or similar microstructure issues that may add error to the yield. Table 4 compares the observed and theoretical underpricing for the discriminatory auctions. While the average observed underpricing is statistically di¤erent from the average theoretical underpricing (but only marginally so under the in…nite number of bidders assumption), they are of similar economic magnitude -0.59 basis points of observed underpricing compared to 0.73 basis points of predicted underpricing in the continuumof-bidders model. The similar magnitude is striking, considering that the theoretical prediction is not based on any in-sample estimation. In fact, the theoretical underpricing is higher than the observed underpricing, even when no bidder has any market power.
This suggests that the market-power arguments proposed in the literature are not necessary to explain the level of observed underpricing. Allowing for a small amount of market power by assuming a …nite number of bidders, the theoretical underpricing is further above the observed underpricing (although still of the same order of magnitude). Rather than wondering about the existence of underpricing, we might ask why there is not more underpricing.
Insert T able 4
Under the uniform-price format (Table 5) , the existence of statistically signi…cant underpricing immediately rejects the model under the continuum-of-bidders assumption.
However, with 20 bidders assumed, the average theoretical underpricing is economically similar to (and not statistically di¤erent from) the average observed underpricing. With ten or …ve bidders, the average observed underpricing is below the theoretical prediction. Table 5 also reports the results for the two-year and …ve-year notes separately.
Insert T able 5
I now turn to the model's prediction for underpricing in the cross section, i.e., I examine how successful it is in explaining underpricing auction-by-auction. Tables 4 and 5, report the cross-sectional correlation between the theoretical and observed underpricing. In all cases the correlation is positive (0.57 to 0.58 for discriminatory auctions and 0.75 to 0.79 for uniform-price auctions) and highly signi…cant. Table 6 reports the results of regressions of the observed underpricing on the theoretical underpricing. A positive slope coe¢cient would indicate a correlation between the theoretical and observed underpricing. If the model were a perfect …t, we would expect an intercept of zero and a slope coe¢cient of one.
Insert T able 6
For the discriminatory auction, I …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant slope coe¢cient (ranging from 0.33 to 0.49) re ‡ecting the correlation between the theoretical and observed underpricing. The adjusted-R 2 is approximately 0.31. However, the slope coe¢cient is also signi…cantly less than one and the intercept is statistically signi…cantly greater than zero, indicating that there are e¤ects that are not captured by the model. Errors in measuring the theoretical underpricing can also explain the slope of less than one.
For the uniform-price auction, the regression again shows a positive and signi…cant slope indicating support for the model. However, the estimated slope coe¢cient is well above one (ranging from 2.43 to 9.27) suggesting that underpricing is far more sensitive to the auction statistics than the model predicts. The adjusted-R 2 is 0.57.
In summary, the average underpricing is similar to that predicted by the model for both the discriminatory and the uniform-price auctions. Moreover, the underpricing predicted by the model for each individual auction is highly correlated with the observed underpricing in the cross section. However, the regressions show that particularly for the uniform-price auctions, the model does not fully explain the the cross-sectional variation in underpricing.
Implications and Conclusion
The price obtained by the U.S. Treasury in the auctions of Treasury securities is less than that observed in the concurrent secondary market. I …nd that this underpricing occurs under both the older discriminatory auctions and the newer uniform-price auctions, although to a lesser extent in uniform-price auctions. This paper explores the role that the auction mechanism plays in producing underpricing, and the extent of that underpricing, in a model in which individual bidders have little market power. The model predicts that the discriminatory mechanism should result in underpricing. The amount of underpricing depends on the dispersion of signals and on the ratio of securities o¤ered to bids tendered.
In contrast, the model predicts underpricing in uniform-price auctions only when there are a …nite number of bidders, i.e., when each bidder has a small amount of market power.
Again, the extent of this underpricing depends on the dispersion of bids and the ratio of supply to demand.
The model is designed so that the summary statistics revealed after each auction can be used to predict the amount of underpricing in that auction. I …nd that the average level of underpricing predicted by the model is of similar magnitude to the observed underpricing for both auction formats. Additionally, the theoretical underpricing is highly correlated with the observed underpricing over the cross section of auctions.
The model shows that underpricing increases in the dispersion of signals. A policy implication is that if information that reduces uncertainty about the value of the security can be revealed, underpricing can be reduced. This supports the rationale for the existence of the when-issued market prior to the auction as a path to reducing price uncertainty.
Additionally, when auctions are clustered together, the early auctions reveal interest-rate information and reduce uncertainty about the value of the securities to be auctioned later.
Since longer-term securities are more volatile in price space and thus more susceptible to underpricing, the ordering of the auctions from shorter duration securities to longer duration securities may reduce underpricing for those securities that are most a¤ected by it. Of course, this is an empirical question, but the results suggest that the ordering of auctions may a¤ect total underpricing. However, the main policy implication of this paper is that the use of the uniformprice mechanism enhances Treasury-auction revenue. The theoretical arguments in the literature cautioning that uniform-price auctions may lead to lower revenue (e.g., through collusive-type equilibria) do not appear to be a problem in this market.
Appendix A: Proofs Proof of Proposition 1
Recall, the signal received by bidder i is
Since there is a continuum of bidders (and given the e¢ciency assumption) the signal of the stop-out bidder (i.e., the marginal bidder) is S s = ¹ V + ¾ 1 z.
Recall that bidder i's maximization problem is
De…ning bidder i's shading as K i (i.e., so that B i = S i ¡ K i ), and the stop-out bidder's shading as K , (substituting for B i , B s , and V ) the bidder's problem can be written as
The …rst-order condition is:
Since all bidders face the same …rst-order condition, I choose the equilibrium in which
Thus it is an equilibrium, for each bidder i, to bid
(The second-order condition is satis…ed by the assumed increasing hazard rate of f (:).)
Proof of Proposition 2
The winning bidders have a signal which is biased, on average, by W C ® over V (by the de…nition of W C ® ), or by W C ® +¾ 0 e ² 0 over V . Since all bidders shade by K, it follows directly that the average pro…ts to winning bidders is
Proof of Proposition 3
I will …rst prove that there are no equilibria with positive expected underpricing.
Suppose such an equilibrium existed. Since ® < 1, there exists a bidder i for which the probability of winning is less than one, and his expected pro…ts is less than E(¼ u )
(the expected pro…t conditional on winning the auction). Since there is a continuum of bidders, bidder i can change his bid without changing the equilibrium uniform price paid.
If the bidder changes his bid from B i to B remains the same, but the probability of winning the auction strictly increases, increasing expected pro…t. Thus, there cannot be such an equilibrium. Similarly if E(¼ u ) < 0, each bidder would prefer to lower his bid to reduce the probability of earning negative pro…ts.
To …nd an equilibrium, recall that the bidder's objective is
where the u superscript refers to the uniform-price auction and the s subscript refers to the stop-out bidder.
As in the proof to Proposition 1, using the signal structure and the continuum of bidders, the maximization problem can be written as
The …rst-order condition is
In equilibrium, setting
In fact, any set of bids for which all bidders earn zero expected pro…ts is an equilibrium, because each zero mass bidder will be indi¤erent between remaining at the proposed equilibrium and changing his bid to change the probability of winning the auction.
Proof of Proposition 4
Since there are a N bidders, bidder i wins the auction if his signal is higher than the random. Thus the stop-out bid, given V , is also random.
As in Proposition 1, bidder i's maximization problem is
De…ning bidder i's shading as K i (i.e., so that B i = S i ¡ K i ); de…ning the stop-out bidder's shading as K ; and recalling that e Z a b is de…ned as the b th order statistic from a draws from the distribution f (:); the bidder's problem can be written as
The integral
f(² i )d² i is the probability of a draw being above the top M among N ¡ 1, i.e., the probability of being within the top M out of N. In expectation, this is (by symmetry) M=N = ®.
Thus, it is an equilibrium, for each bidder i, to bid
The amount of expected underpricing is equal to this shading, K , minus the bias in the winning bids (i.e., the winner's curse). The winner's curse is the bias in the signal conditional upon being above the top M th highest signals out of the other N ¡ 1 bidders.
Thus, the expected underpricing is
Proof of Proposition 5
In the uniform-price auction, the winning bidders all pay the M + 1 The bidder's maximization problem (as in Proposition 3) is as follows:
A :
The amount of expected underpricing is equal to this shading, K 
A : Thirteen-week bills are always reissues of old 26-week bills that have 13 weeks remaining, (i.e., the auction increases the supply of the old security) and 4-week bills are similarly reissues of outstanding bills. Additionally, the Treasury occasionally auctions cash management bills with maturities between just a few days and a year to meet the Treasury's daily cash ‡ow needs. Treasury bill prices in both the auction and the secondary market are quoted using a banker's discount rate. The relationship between the rate, r, and price, P , is P = 100(1 ¡ r(T =360)), where T is the number of days until maturity.
The schedule for the Treasury notes changes from time to time, but the most frequently and regularly auctioned notes are the two-year securities which are auctioned towards the end of each month. Three-year notes, 5-year notes and 10-year notes are issued less 23 More information about the Treasury auction and the when-issued markets can be found in Sundaresan (1997) . The de…nitive rules of the Treasury auction are in the Federal Register (1999).
frequently. Occasionally, an auctioned security has exactly the same maturity and coupon as an existing older security. In that case, the new security is a reissue of the older security.
In the primary market (i.e., the auction) the notes are quoted in yields. In the secondary market, prices are quoted.
Prior to the auction, the approximate total face value of securities is announced. The competitive portion of the auction proceeds as follows: Bidders submit (possibly multiple) sealed bids as yield-quantity pairs prior to the auction. Bids are submitted on a half basis point grid for bills and a tenth of a basis point grid for notes and bonds. 25 Securities are awarded to those that bid lowest yield and further awards are made successively at higher rates until the supply is exhausted. Bids at the highest accepted rate are prorated if necessary. For coupon bearing securities, the coupon is set at the time of the auction as the average winning yield rounded down to the nearest eighth of a percent. 24 Recent auctions have been on the order of $20 billion. 25 In the earlier part of the data used in this study, bids were submitted in whole basis points.
Under the old discriminatory mechanism, each of the winning bidders pays a price corresponding to the yield in his own bid. Thus, not all winning bidders pay the same price.
The uniform-price mechanism began as an experiment for the two-year and …ve-year notes in 1992 and was expanded to all securities in 1998. With this mechanism, all winning bidders pay the price corresponding to the highest winning yield.
Auctions are usually held at 1 p.m. and the results are announced shortly afterward. This panel examines the difference in underpricing between discriminatory and uniform-price auctions. Underpricing is measured in basis points and is defined as the auction yield minus the average when-issued yield close to the 1:00 auction time. The auction yield is the average winning yield for discriminatory auctions and the market-clearing yield for uniform-price auctions. The three rows refer to different time periods over which the when-issued price is averaged. The average when-issued price is quantity weighted and based on trade prices. Reissues and index-linked securities are excluded. This table compares the underpricing observed in uniform-price auctions and the theoretical underpricing based on the model and parameters inferred from the auction results. Observed underpricing is the difference between the market-clearing yield in the auction and the quantity-weighted average trade yield in the when-issued market in the ten-minute period prior to the auction. The theoretical underpricing is based on the model (using various assumptions on the number of bidders). The model parameter values are inferred for each auction based on the bid-cover ratio and the auction tail. This figure linearly interpolates between marked points. Underpricing is lower when there is a lower ratio of securities to bidders (α). Underpricing decreases with the number of bidder. Discriminatory auctions have more underpricing.
